



مركز مساواة
Mossawa Center
מרכז מוסאוא

The Arab Citizens of Israel and the 2006 War in Lebanon: Reflections and Realities

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I. Introduction

The recent war in Lebanon captured the attention of the world from its start on July 12, 2006 to the eventual ceasefire over a month later, provoking international discussion about the continuing conflict in the Middle East. Throughout this period the Arab citizens of Israel remained largely overlooked and misunderstood by the authorities of the State of Israel, the Israeli public and media, and a great part of the international community.

The Mossawa Center has written this paper to provide an accurate understanding of not only the Arab community's pro-peace sentiment and their struggle with the injustices during the conflict, as well as offer recommendations in terms of international action in the region.

The Mossawa Center, the advocacy center for Arab citizens of Israel, seeks to improve the social, economic and political status of the Arab citizens of Israel without sacrificing their identity as Palestinians. The Center works in cooperation with local and international human rights NGOs, elected Arab local councils, Members of Knesset, other minority groups within Israel and foreign embassies. To meet its goals, the Center utilizes legal advocacy, quantitative analyses of the state budget and economic programs, capacity building for local councils and NGOs, lobbying, media campaigns, community dialogue and outreach, international advocacy, youth exchanges and human rights training.

In this paper, the Mossawa Center refers to the Arabs of Israel as "Arab citizens of Israel" and the "Arab community of Israel." The use of these terms reflects both the community's self-identification as part of the Palestinian people and as citizens of the state of Israel. Although not all Israeli citizens of Arab origin identify as Palestinian, the Arab community in Israel, including leading civil society organizations and political parties, increasingly use this terminology.



II. Background

History and relationship between the Palestinian Arab and Lebanese community

Following Israel's declaration of statehood in 1948 and the continued conflict between the Jews and Arabs, 940,000 Palestinians were expelled and fled from their homes in what became the State of Israel.¹ 780,000 of these Palestinians became refugees, while the 160,000 that remained were given citizenship in the newly established State of Israel, creating the base of the present Arab community.² The Arab community of Israel represents about twenty percent of the total population of the state of Israel — according to 2006 statistics, about 1.4 million of 7 million citizens³. The Arab population is distributed throughout mixed urban areas, such as Tel Aviv-Jafa, Haifa and Lod, the Galilee region of Northern Israel, the Triangle of central Israel and the Naqab, in the south.

The Arab community of Israel has had a mixed relationship with its neighbor Lebanon. Although there has been no strong connection with their political system, strong familial ties remain due to the refugee situation. About 100,000 displaced Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon following Israel's declaration of statehood.⁴

After Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in an attempt to remove the PLO, Israel allowed Lebanese Phalangist forces into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon, standing by while the Phalangist forces massacred over a thousand people.⁵ These events caused shock and outrage in the Arab community.

However, over time the atrocity served to strengthen the Palestinian identity among the Arab citizens in Israel in addition to increasing their solidarity with their family ties in Lebanon.⁶

Politically, connections between the Arab community of Israel and the government of Lebanon have been weak, which is possibly attributed to the relationship between Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese government. Lebanon did not grant Palestinian refugees citizenship, and refugees continue to suffer hostility.⁷ In fact, in a 1995 survey, 75% of the Lebanese rejected the idea of Palestinian refugee

¹ As'ad Ghanem and Srah Ozacky-Lazar, "The Status of the Palestinians in Israel in an Era of Peace: Part of the problem but not part of the solution," The Israeli Palestinians: An Arab Minority in the Jewish State, ed. Alexander Bligh, (Portland: Taylor & Francis, 2003), 263.

² Ghanem 264.

³ "Eve of 58th Independence Day: Over 7 Million Residents in the State of Israel," Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, Sep. 2006, Government of Israel, 4 Sep. 2006 <http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200611092>

⁴ Elia Zureik, Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process, (Institute of Palestine Studies, 1996), 33.

⁵ "Israel: Sharon Investigation Urged," Human Rights News, June 2001, Human Rights Watch, 4 Sep. 2006 <<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/06/23/isrlpa97.htm>>.

⁶ Reuven Paz, "The Israeli Arabs and Lebanon: A New Phase?" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2000.

⁷ Zureik 30.



resettlement in Lebanon, citing that it would lead to demographic imbalances, return the country to civil war and hurt the economy.⁸

The first official visit of the Arab leaders of Israel to Lebanon came only in February of 2005, when Arab members of Knesset Ahmed Tibi and Azmi Bashara attended the funeral of assassinated former Prime Minister, Rafik Al-Hariri.

Figures as of December 2003 account for about 394,500 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, many with relatives in Northern Israel.⁹

Current Status of the Arab community in Israel

For the past 58 years, the Arab community of Israel has been the subject of social and economic injustice and suffered discrimination by the State of Israel. Discrimination has led to a lack of representation in government offices (6% Arab representation), disproportionate allocation of funds in the regular governmental budget (5% of the budget in 2005) as well as in the development budget to Arab Localities (3% of the budget 2005), lack of property and land rights (only 3.5% of the Arab community owns land). The thousands of citizens living unrecognized villages in the Naqab and Galilee are denied basic services such as health clinics, land development plans, permanent homes and schools, roads, electricity and running water.

Since October 2000, 32 Arab citizens have been shot and killed by Israeli security forces. 13 of the victims were killed during the October 2000 demonstrations and since then a further 19 victims have been killed. In many instances, it is clear that those killed were innocent of any transgression. There are no such cases of Jewish suspects killed in a chase.

In a 2003 poll, 53% of the Jews surveyed stated they are against full equality for Arabs while 63% thought Arabs should be encouraged to emigrate.

Despite continuing discrimination in education, health services, land and property allocation, activism and community empowerment continue to develop among the Arab citizens in Israel.¹⁰

The second Lebanon war came by surprise to most of the public of Israel, quite particularly to the Arab community. A new government had just been elected, and the people of Israel had expected the new government's agenda to focus on strengthening the internal social economic agenda in Israel, and the withdrawal from the West Bank. Instead, the country felt the effects of the large scale conflict with Lebanon, the destruction of cities and the deaths of civilians. The war took a heavy toll on the Arab community — 18 Arab citizens were killed during the shelling of Northern Israel during the conflict, making up 44% of the total civilian casualties in Israel.

⁸ Zureik 10.

⁹ "Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles," UNRWA: Palestine Refugees, Dec. 2003, UNRWA, 4 Sep. 2006 <<http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html>>.

¹⁰ Mossawa Center, The Palestinian Arab Citizens of Israel: Status, Opportunities and Challenges for an Israel-Palestinian Peace. June 2006.



III. The Arab community during the war

Aside from suffering civilian losses, the Arab community was the subject of incitement and discrimination, despite their clear position of peace during the war.

Discrimination

Continuing discrimination and large discrepancies in public resource allocation have created significant economic, social and political gaps between the Jewish and Arab communities of Israel. These social injustices were only further exemplified in political behavior, decisions and legislation passed during wartime.

Lack of infrastructure and government services

- According to an interview in Haaretz, Sharon Azrieli, a local security leader of the Union of Local Authorities, almost 30% of the of Israel's residents are without bomb shelters, and the majority of these residents from the Arab community.¹¹ A survey of 67 Arab localities done by the Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education in 2003 revealed that 38 lacked bomb shelters for their schools.¹² Many of the deaths that occurred in the Arab community were a direct result of the lack of an available shelter to take cover in during air raids. In fact, many of the Arab villages completely lacked an alarm system; people in these villages depended upon hearing the sirens from other nearby towns. The Arab village of Shagor, for example, had only three shelters and experienced four civilian casualties, while the neighboring towns of Tiberius, with 8,000 fewer inhabitants, had 633 shelters and no casualties (see Appendix A).¹³ Although the Mossawa Center petitioned the construction of shelters and alarms for Arab villages through correspondence with various government bodies already in 2003, no direct response was given to the issue of the lack of shelters in the Arab community in replies.¹⁴
- Following the bombing of an apartment building in the Arab neighborhood of Wadi Nisnas in Haifa on August 6, 2006, state and local government failed to respond to the condition of the location and its tenants for three days. The tenants and families had no permanent housing situation, the rubble of their building was not cleaned up, and asbestos and broken sewage systems became an issue. The deputy mayor however, had no difficulty using the site as a promotional stop for visiting diplomats and media coverage.¹⁵

¹¹ Eli Ashkenazi, "Though officials were warned 5 years ago, bomb shelters weren't ready," Haaretz – Israel News Online, 29 Aug. 2006, 4 Sep. 2006, <<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/755890.html>>.

¹² The Mossawa Center. Israeli Government Ignores Arab Citizens in Preparation for Iraq War. Haifa: The Mossawa Center, 2003.

¹³ Mossawa Center, Gaps in protecting civilians in shelters in nearby localities: Analysis of a database of the Union of Local Councils in Israel. 31 Aug. 2006.

¹⁴ Israeli Homefront Command. Letter to the Mossawa Center. 24 Mar. 2003.

¹⁵ Jehan Shahadi. Personal interview. 9 Aug. 2006.



- A report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs lists 59 of the 109 localities in the Galilee area as Arab.¹⁶ During the war the Minister of Internal Affairs pledged over 120 million NIS to local councils in the Galilee for support during the war. According to an economic analysis by the Mossawa Center, only 29.9% of the 120 million was allocated to Arab local councils, despite the fact that they make up over 50% of the localities.¹⁷ About 40 of the Arab local councils report they are currently unable to pay their staff member salaries due to wartime costs, yet many requests to the ministry and government to assist in paying these salaries have been rejected.
- In yet another case of discrimination, the government created a national committee to address and plan solutions to the damages caused during the war. The committee did not include any Arab members even though a large percentage of war damages were incurred in the north, where as mentioned above, a majority of the Arab population resides.¹⁸
- Other forms of discrimination have been indirect. Since the current government lacks a Ministry of Welfare, much of the aid given to the citizens of the Galilee area has come from local and international Jewish agencies. While it is not the intention of such aid agencies to discriminate against the Arab community, their priority is the Jewish community.
- In many cases, state assistance, benefits, housing options, loans and educational opportunities are contingent upon military service in Israel, which is not mandatory for Arab citizens. The MATI (Center for Promoting Small Businesses) business development organization, working under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, announced at the end of the war that it was offering special interest-free loans to small businesses in the north from drawing from a both private and state funds. The loans, however, were made available only to Jewish citizens and former soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces.¹⁹ The Mossawa Center filed suit since these loans unfairly discriminate against the Arab community. Following the Mossawa criticism and intervention, MATI decided to completely stop the distribution of these funds as opposed to offering an equal distribution scheme.

¹⁶ Ministry of Internal Affairs. Internal Report on the amount of support given to local councils during the war. Unpublished. 15 Aug. 2006.

¹⁷ Union of Local Authorities. Damage from the war. Unpublished. 30 Aug. 2006.

¹⁸ “Olmert establishes a reconstruction committee for rebuilding the Galilee,” Haaretz [Tel Aviv], 6 Aug. 2006.

¹⁹ Amiram Barkat, “Jewish Agency launches campaign to rehabilitate North,” Haaretz [Tel Aviv], 16 Aug. 2006

<<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArtVty.jhtml?sw=small+business&itemNo=750950>>.



Lack of Information in Arabic

- With the bulk of major media sources in Israel in the Hebrew language, and the lack of a significant and widely available Arabic media presence, information regarding the war during wartime was not always easily attainable for the Arab community, particularly those living in more rural areas. The three major TV channels (1, 2, 10) neglected to transmit or even translate important safety information in Arabic. The government made an effort to keep the public informed as to how to respond to air raid sirens and emergency situations during the war, but printed informational brochures only in Hebrew, excluding the Arab community from vital potentially life-saving information. Only during the last week of the war did they finally release an Arabic version of the pamphlet. The Israeli Homefront Command did not attempt to exercise their authority and require the broadcasting companies to ensure that the Arab community would remain informed.²⁰

Incitement and Violence

Israel is bound by both domestic and international law to protect its citizens against racism and discriminatory action based on race, ethnicity, color or national origin.²¹ However, race-based violence against Arabs continues to be largely ignored by the government and law enforcement agencies. During the war, several instances of race-based incitement and violence against Arab citizens and political leaders were brought to the Mossawa Center's attention.

Political and public incitement

- Ghazi Fallah, a professor of geography at an American university in Ohio and a citizen of Israel as well as Canada, was arrested for taking photos in a tourist area in Northern Israel. He was taken into custody and detained in Haifa for over three weeks, then released without further charges.²²
- Several Arab MKs were ejected from a Knesset meeting “after heckling Defense Minister Amir Peretz and opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu during their speeches on the war in Lebanon”²³ while soldiers laughed and applauded. MK Ilyahu Gabai called Arab

²⁰ The Mossawa Center. Letter to the Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs. 22 Aug. 2006.

²¹ Israel Sentencing Law of 1977. 20 Nov. 2002; The UN Convention and the Elimination of All Form of Racial Discrimination ratified by Israel in 1979.

²² Carol Biliczky, “UA prof to stay in Israeli custody for week,” Akron Beacon Journal [Ohio]. 18 Jul. 2006 <<http://www.ohio.com/mld/ohio/news/15063076.htm>>.

²³ “Three Arab MKs removed from Knesset session,” The Jerusalem Post, 31 Jul. 2006

<<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPostArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1153292040492>>.



MKs “representatives of Hezbollah in the Knesset.”²⁴ MK Jamal Zahalka was described by Roni Bar-on, Interior Minister as “a snake born to a snake” following Zahalka’s criticism of the government’s activity in Lebanon,²⁵ and MK Ahmed Tibi received threats on his life in anonymous emails and phone calls.

- Another Arab citizen, Fadallah Deffallah, was beaten by the police after he presented them his ID card, simply because his name bore a resemblance to the last name of the Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah. A legal case has been filed by the Mossawa Center.²⁶
- In several cases, demonstrators were arrested as well. Two staff members of the Mossawa Center were arrested by the police in a demonstration in Haifa on July 25. In Haifa, two civilians were arrested and forced to undress on a main street by the police, who claimed they were planning to commit a suicide bombing. No bombs were found on their person or vehicles, yet they were detained for several days.²⁷

Media Coverage

- In many cases, media coverage was more discriminatory than incite-causing; the Arab perspective and position was often simply ignored by both the Hebrew and international media. However, in many cases, there was direct incitement against the Arab community; Arabs who did not support the war were labeled as Hezbollah supporters, and Arabs who blamed Israel’s aggression for the deaths of family members were labeled extremists.²⁸

²⁴ “Arab MKs are taken from the Knesset and soldiers cheer.” Maariv [Tel Aviv], 1 Aug. 2006: 7.

²⁵ Rob Winder, “Dissenting voices for peace” Al Jazeera, 20 Jul. 2006 <<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B121A6B2-3EFF-40F9-B587-F5F39C4DF4B6.htm>>.

²⁶ The Mossawa Center. Letter to the Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs. 22 Aug. 2006.

²⁷ Miran Rappaport, “Chief of Haifa Police arrests suspects on their way to attack,” Maariv [Tel Aviv], 18 Aug. 2006: 16.

²⁸ Itamar Marcus and Barbara Cook. “Nasrallah Superman: An analysis of the war in Lebanon from the Palestinian perspective,” Palestinian Media Watch Aug 2006, 30 Aug. 2006 <http://pmw.org.il/bulletins_aug2006.htm#b100806>.



IV. Position of the Mossawa Center

From the beginning of the war to the declaration of the ceasefire, the Mossawa Center, as well as other Arab civil society organizations, demanded an immediate end to the violence and the conflict and called for a solution through diplomatic channels.

This stance was reflected in the Center's actions as well; the Mossawa Center participated in demonstrations across the country with civil society asking for peace, and called for the international community to take action to help end the bloodshed in both countries in press releases and interviews.

The Arab citizens in Israel have consistently stood against war and have stood for support peace agreements; they are both citizens of Israel, and Arabs and Palestinians. Although they experienced personal losses in Israel in the attacks by Hezbollah, their friends and family in Lebanon and Palestine were killed as result of the attacks by Israel. The Israeli government's historical policy of using force and one-sided solutions to end conflicts, such as in the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, have served only to further aggravate the tension in the region. Therefore the solution to this situation should involve the international community and be based upon a peace agreement rather than a unilateral solution.

Contrary to the accusations of right-wing politicians and much of the coverage of the Israeli media, the position of the majority of the Arab community of Israel during the recent war in Lebanon was and remains a position of peace. The unique status of the Arab citizens of Israel and their relationship with the Lebanese and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon certainly placed them under the scrutiny from both politicians and the Jewish public alike, and the Arab community was regrettably often seen more as a threat rather than a potential resource for solving the conflict. With friends and family on both sides of the border falling victim to the tragedy of the war, peace was the only answer to the conflict for the Arab community of Israel.



V. Position of the Arab Political Parties

The Arab political parties of Israel divide along the three ideologies: communist, nationalist and Islamic. The communist party has generally revealed itself in joint Jewish-Arab parties, whereas the nationalist and Islamic ideologies have been chiefly represented by independent Arab parties. As the popularity of these parties among the Arabs has increased, the support to the Zionist parties has decreased.

As of the 2006 parliamentary elections, there are 12 Arab MKs and 1 Jewish MK representing an Arab- Jewish party, distributed across the parties as shown in the table below:

Table 1: Arab MKs and MKs of Arab-Jewish parties

Name of Party	Knesset Member Leader
The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash)	Mohammad Barakeh
	Hanna Sweid
	Dov Hanin
The National Democratic Assembly Party (Balad)	Azmi Bishara
	Jamal Zahalka
	Wasel Taha
United Arab List	Ibrahim Sarsour The Islamic Movement
	Ahmad Tibi The Arabic Movement for Change (Ta'al)
	Talb El-Sane The Arab Democratic Party
	Abbas Zakkur The Islamic Movement
Labor Party	Nadia Helo
	Raleb Majadele
Kadima	Mjali Wihbi

Nine of the Arab MKs elected by Arab or Arab – Jewish parties, two belongs to the Labor party, one to Kadima, while the one Jewish MK is a member of Hadash. The Arab MKs of the Labor party and Kadima participated in the coalition.

56% of the eligible voters from the Arab community participated in the elections in 2006, down from 62% in 2003, and 75% in 1999.²⁹ In the 2001 elections, in protest of unfulfilled promises by Prime Minister Barak as well as the killing of 13 citizens at the start the al-Aqsa intifada, the Arab community organized an election

²⁹ “Elections for the 17th Knesset: Lists and Candidates” at <http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections17/eng/list/ListIndex>.



boycott, resulting in an 18% voter turnout, a historic low.³⁰ More voter frustration stems from the 2003 change in voter threshold from 1.5% to 2%, forcing Arab groups and parties to consolidate their objectives in order to gain representation in the parliament.

Voting trends illustrate the tensions between the Arab community and state institutions; although the Arab community has political and electoral relevancy and is a strong enough voting group to potentially affect the both electoral outcomes and the regional situation, the community experiences political discrimination within Israel and little attention from outside parties.

During the war the Arab political parties were solidly united against the military confrontation. Here are the specific positions of the Arab political parties:

Islamic Movement:

The Islamic movement split into two factions in 1996 — the Southern branch continues to remain active in local and parliamentary politics in order to remain active in the political sphere, while the Northern branch rejects participation in national elections. The Southern Islamic Movement runs under the United Arab List along with The Arabic Movement for Change and The Arab Democratic Party

MK Ibrahim Sarsur:³¹ *Our position is similar to the position of the Arab community, which opposed the war in Lebanon. The war against Lebanon was an aggression against the Lebanese people, land and state, and also violated international law. The Islamic movement saw the war as an attempt by Israel to demonstrate its power in the region. We demanded an immediate stop of the aggression.*

The Islamic Movement organized and participated in demonstrations along with other political parties, as well as meetings in and out of Knesset, standing against those who pushed for the war. The Islamic Movement found the greatest problem to be the overwhelming consensus among the Jewish public and political parties in support of the war. The Islamic Movement criticized this consensus and approached the conflict as a rational voice that condemned destruction and war. Particularly distressing was the fact that the Jewish public and parties treated the voice of the Arab community and the Arab political parties as “traitors” and as “allies of Hezbollah”³² simply because they refused to support the war and resolve the conflict with violence.

The Islamic Movement faced incitement against its members in particular, since they are considered an Islamic party and the resistance in Lebanon was considered an Islamic resistance. Therefore, this has affected several issues in the state’s treatment of the Islamic Movement as a political party.

³⁰ The United States Jewish Committee, Israel/Middle East Briefing, Appendix 4: Voter Turnout (Jan. 16, 2003) at <http://www.ajc.org/Israel/IsraelMideastBriefingsDetail.asp?did=208&pid=1593#appendix4>.

³¹ Ibrahim Sarsur. Phone interview. 3 Sep. 2006.

³² Sarsur.



Democratic Front for Peace and Equality:

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Communist Party has been the only legal party to consistently represent the Palestinian Arab population of Israel. In 1977, the Communist Party combined with several independent groups to create Hadash, or the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE). DFPE, which works for equal rights and the recognition of the Arab population of Israel as a national minority has remained popular with the Arab community since the '70s, and continues to gain support.

MK Hanna Sweid:³³ *We opposed the war from its early beginning and said this war will end exactly similar to the previous war in 1982; Israel will sink in the Lebanese swamp. No one will benefit, neither Lebanon nor Israel, from this war. We also opposed the position of the U.S., which supported the war and pushed toward more destruction. The U.S. did not work for a ceasefire, and therefore we see a direct responsibility of the U.S. to launch this war and keep it going.*

DFPE expressed its position opposing the war in the Knesset, and attempted to give full coverage of the events of the war to the media as well as write articles in the party's newspaper calling for reason, criticizing this war. DFPE had meetings in Sakhnin, Taybe, Nazareth and Tel Aviv where there were also weekly demonstrations against the war organized by DFPE and other political organizations and parties. DFPE attempted to work with the Jewish mainstream with people and institutions opposing the war, but found few groups in strong opposition the war.

DFPE felt that the Arab parties were used as a scapegoat for the Knesset, and a distraction from asking the question of why the war was launched. DFPE requested the international community to exercise pressure on Israel to stop the blind use of power and to push Israel toward solving problems through dialogue and diplomacy, as opposed to force. DFPE hopes that the tensions between Israel and Lebanon are resolved soon, including the issues of the exchange of prisoners and the aerial, land and sea blockade of Lebanon.

National Democratic Assembly (Balad):

Established in 1996 by Azmi Bishara, Balad shares the nationalist ideology of Al-Ard, the nationalist movement outlawed by the Israeli High Court in 1965 because it rejected the Jewish nature of the state and identified with "enemy" Arab states. Balad aims to transform Israel from a "Jewish and democratic state" to a "state for all its citizens."³⁴

MK Jamal Zahalka:³⁵ *We were against the war from the beginning to the end and demanded an immediate ceasefire. We think that the prisoner issue can be solved in a human, diplomatic way. We considered this war was an American*

³³ Hanna Sweid. Phone interview. 3 Sep. 2006.

³⁴ "Parliamentary groups in the Knesset: National Democratic Assembly (Balad)" at http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FationPage_eng.asp?PG=30.

³⁵ Jamal Zahalka. Phone interview. 3 Sep. 2006.



war since the U.S. was supporting and encouraging and pushing for it. Israel has fought this war to prove its power and therefore its use of power was excessive. The world must understand that this conflict is not an Israeli-Palestinian conflict or an Israeli-Lebanese conflict or an Israeli-Syrian conflict; rather it is an Israeli-Arab conflict, therefore the solution must be an Israeli-Arab solution, and therefore we adopt the Arab initiative for peace in the Middle East.

Regarding Rice's statement about the birth pangs of a "New Middle East,"³⁶ the Balad party asks, "Is the 'New Middle East' like the new Iraq?" Regarding the U.S. policy on the Middle East, Balad sees an attempt to connect Lebanon with the U.S. alliance and to abolish the barrier in front of the creation of this alliance. The starting point of the destruction of these barriers was Hezbollah in Lebanon; the continuation would have been Syria and Iran.

The Balad party organized many demonstrations across the country, and two large ones in Nazareth and Tira. Balad participated with other political parties in demonstrations Um al-Fahim and in Majd al-Krum in addition to the Jewish-Arab peace demonstration in Tel Aviv. Zahalka himself was the subject of incitement as mentioned above, being removed twice from the Knesset hall and called a "snake born of a snake" by Roni Bar-on, Minister of Internal Affairs.

³⁶ Condoleeza Rice, press conference, U.S. Department of State, Washington DC, 21 Jul. 2006 <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm>.



VI. Recommendations

Based upon the situation and ordeals confronting the Arab community during and following the recent war in Lebanon, the Mossawa Center proposes the following recommendations to the international community, including the Arab region:

1. Ensure the participation of the Arab community in creating an atmosphere of peace and protecting their rights. The unique status and accessibility of the Arab community should be utilized. The Israeli government should protect and ensure both the human and civil rights of this minority community and provide equal access to public resources and the legal system.
2. The UN international troops that will secure the ceasefire in south Lebanon are an important step toward international protection of civilians in the region. The Mossawa Center calls the international community to create a similar force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to ensure a ceasefire in these areas. The international community must remain aware and involved in the situation as it continues to unfold in the region.
3. The UN should create an international task force for peace negotiations. The international community can play a key role as a mediator as it has in the past, helping promote peace agreements and fostering hostage exchanges.
4. Increase the involvement of civil society. A strong civil society has long been cited as a pillar of stability and an indicator of a thriving democracy.³⁷ By strengthening civil society throughout the region, we can hope to achieve more solid democratic system as well as an atmosphere of peace.
5. Encourage development in the region. Although Israel was ranked number 22 out of 177 countries surveyed in the UN Human Development Index,³⁸ there are disparaging development gaps between not only the Arab and Jewish citizens, but between Israel and the rest of the Arab world as well. Poverty, low literacy rates, unemployment and lack of social services in Arab communities lead to discontent populations and further exacerbate the conflict in the region.³⁹ By building programs based on UN development reports, the international community will be able to both aid faltering communities, as well as help diffuse civil and political tensions.

³⁷ Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 89-107.

³⁸ "Israel Fact Sheet," HDR 2005 – Country Fact Sheets. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 31 Aug. 2006
<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ISR.html>.

³⁹ (2005). The Arab Human Development Report 2004. Towards Freedom in the Arab World. Z. J. Barbara Brewka, UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States.



6. Strengthen democracy in the region. As the Middle East sees political changes as the new elites struggle to share power with old, the international community has continued to attempt to intervene in the region on behalf of the ideals of democracy. Democracy in the region will be best strengthened by strengthening the voice of the people and encouraging democratic processes. The international community must strengthen the demands of the people, and not force democracy through violence and military intervention.



Appendix A: Gaps in protecting civilians in shelters in nearby localities

Cities	Civilian Casualties	Inhabitants in thousands	Shelters	Social economic level
Nazareth	2 killed	71.5	100	3
Nazareth Ilit	-	51.2	523	5

Cities	Civilian Casualties	Inhabitants in thousands	Shelters	Social economic level
Shagor	4	28	3	3
Tiberius	-	20.7	633	4
Carmeil	-	48.1	520	6

Cities	Civilian Casualties	Inhabitants in thousands	Shelters	Social economic level
Mghar	2	18.8	23	3
Misgav	-	18.2	350	6

Social economic levels according to the Israeli statistical data ranks local councils from 1-10, 1 being the lowest.



Appendix B: The Arab community and the governmental plan for the rehabilitation of the North following the war

Following the war in Lebanon, the Israeli Prime Minister established a governmental committee to create a program to rehabilitate Northern Israel and Haifa. Most governmental ministries were requested to allocate a percentage of their annual budget for this program. According to the general manager of the Prime Minister's office, one third of the government's total rehabilitation budget was to be designated specifically for developing projects in the Arab community — an amount equivalent to **921 million NIS**.

The Mossawa Center's analysis of the rehabilitation budget revealed that most of the ministries participating in this program did not clearly define the budgets they intended to allocate to rehabilitating Arab cities and villages in the north. The only clearly marked projects for the Arab community are:

Ministry	Field	Budget (Million NIS)
Trade, Industry & Employment	Upgrading & developing industrial zones	25
	Day care centers*	10
	Employing Arab academics **	- -
Infrastructure	Sewage grants	170
Transportation	Urban roads ***	145
Housing	Developing infrastructure	52
Total		402

* Joint budget with unspecified allocation for Arab community

** Budget conditional according to the number of Arab academics recruited

*** Arab Community is first priority

The above total is far less than the amount originally designated for the Arab community and its urgent needs in the North, particularly following the war. The total of 402 million NIS is less than half of the 921 million NIS promised by the budgets of the government.

In order to clarify and facilitate the process of monitoring and implementing the projects for the Arab community, the Mossawa Center has demanded that the government clearly mark the budgets allocated for the Arab community from each ministry.

This summary is derived from part of a report by Mossawa Center senior staff members that covers the rehabilitation plans and budget following the war, dealing with each ministry's budget in greater detail, and including demands for the Arab community.



Appendix C: List of Arab Civilian Casualties During the War July 2006 – August 2006

18 of the 39 citizens killed by rockets in Israel were Arab, making up about 46% of the total civilian casualties.

Arab citizens of Israel killed by rockets (name followed by age):

Nazareth 20.7.2006:

Rabie Taluzi, 3
Mahmud Taluzi, 7

E'ebelin 23.7.2006:

Awad Habib, 46

Mgaar village 25.7.2006:

Dua'a Abas, 15

Tarshiha 3.8.2006:

Muhamad Fau'ur, 17
Shinati Shinati, 20
Amir Na'im, 18

Majd Elkrom village 4.8.2006:

Baha Krayem, 34
Mhamad Mana'a, 24

Mgaar village 4.8.2006:

Manal Azam, 26

Arab Elaramshe 5.8.2006:

Fideye Juma'a, 60
Sultana Juma'a, 33
Samira Juma'a, 31

Haifa 7.8.2006:

Hanna Hamam, 62
Labiba Mazzawi, 67

Deir El-Assad 8.10.2006:

Miriam Asadi, 26
Fathi Asadi, 5

Ya'ara 13.8.2006:

Madi Khayat, 84

See <<http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/IsraelUnderAttack/Lebanon+North/attacklebanonnorth.htm>> for a complete list of all casualties.